Planned Unit Development by Ahrens, Clifford H.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 35 
Issue 1 Winter 1970 Article 8 
Winter 1970 
Planned Unit Development 
Clifford H. Ahrens 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Clifford H. Ahrens, Planned Unit Development, 35 MO. L. REV. (1970) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





Too often those who seek to develop new and imaginative solutions
to legal problems are confronted with the attitude that conventional ideas
and legal theory should not be departed from too quickly. This reluctance
is not uncommon in the area of planning, zoning, and land-use controls.'
The most serious criticism of conventional zoning laws is that they con-
centrate on an individual lot-by-lot basis and require strict compliance with
pre-set regulations, which creates diseconomies in large-scale development
and tends to destroy creativity and flexibility. 2 The fact that our zoning
laws require all lots in an entire zoning district to be devoted to a single
use (such as single family dwellings) without permitting supporting com-
mercial and service facilities, has also been regarded by some critics as a
serious flaw in our zoning laws.3
The efforts of those seeking imaginative, flexible, and creative results
from planning, zoning, and land-use controls have recently been concen-
trated on planned unit development (PUD). The basic purpose of PUD
is to do away with the inflexible dimensional standards and use regulations
of conventional zoning and planning laws, and thereby to encourage crea-
tive large-scale development in a way which can best utilize the land for the
collective benefit of the residents. Individual PUD's most frequently in-
volve the use of density zoning, rather than the conventional technique of
minimum lot sizes.4 Under density zoning, by varying lot sizes and using
buildings such as apartments and condominiums along with the customary
single- and multi-family types, the developer is allowed to "duster" his de-
velopment, as long as the prescribed overall density of dwelling units per
acre is maintained. This enables the developer to create more "common
open space." The emphasis in some PUD's is on mixing different building
types or land uses. The basic philosophy of PUD is to substitute flexibility,
creativity, and variety for the inflexibility and lack of variety which con-
ventional zoning often imposes on the developer.
1. See Mandelker, Reflections on the American System of Planning Controls:
A Response to Professor Krasnowiecki, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv. 98 (1965).
2. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNNiENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND
RuRAL AMICA: POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH 108 (1968); J. DELAFONS, LAND-
USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (1962); Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit De-
velopment: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1965).
3. J. JACOBS, THE D.ATn AND LIFE or GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 229 (4th ed.
1961).
4. For a discussion of other inducements often offered for large-scale develop-
ments, see ADvISORY CoM- ISSoN ON INTERGOVERINME.NTAL RELATIONS, supra note 2,
at 111.
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II. VALIDITY OF PUD
A. Statutes
1. Model Planning Enabling Act
Recognition of the need for planning and zoning legislation and regu-
lations which are capable of allowing flexibility and creativity in residential
developments is not of recent origin. Section 12 of the Model Planning
Enabling Act of 19255 set forth a proposal to allow the legislative body to
authorize the planning board to make any reasonable changes upon ap-
proving subdivision plats, when the owner of the land submits a plan desig-
nating the lots on which apartment houses and local shops are to be built
and indicating the maximum density of population and the minimum
yard requirements per lot. Section 12 also limited the average population
density and the total land area covered by buildings in the entire subdi-
vision to that permitted in the original zoning district.6 The planning board
was not to approve the developer's proposal unless the use of adjoining land
was "reasonably safeguarded" and the plan was "consistent with the public
welfare."7 Upon the approval of the planning board following a public
hearing with proper notice, the changes were to become part of the munid-
pality's zoning regulations.8 Section 12 was adopted in the New York City
General City,9 Village,10 and Town1 1 Laws, and in New Jersey12 and
Indiana. 8
2. Standard City Planning Enabling Act
One proponent of PUD, Professor Jan Krasnowiecki of the University
of Pennsylvania, believes Sections 14 and 15 of the Standard City Planning
Enabling Act of 192814 are sufficient to allow PUD's to be established
through the planning commission alone.' 5 Section 15 allowed the planning
board to:
agree with the applicant upon use, height, area or bulk require-
ments or restrictions governing buildings and premises within the
subdivision provided such requirements or restrictions do not
authorize the violation of the then effective zoning ordinance of
the municipality.16
Section 14 allowed the planning board to adopt subdivision regulations
for the proper arrangement of streets ... for adequate and con-
venient open spaces, for traffic, utilities, access of fire-fighting ap-
5. E. BAssrr, Laws of Planning Unbuilt Areas, in NmGHBORHOOD AND CoMf-




9. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw §§ 26-38 (1968).
10. N.Y. VILLAGE LAw §§ 179e-179g (1966).
11. N.Y. TowN LAw §§ 270-282 (1965).
12. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-19 (1940), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-54(1967).
13. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-4756 (7) (1964).
14. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMRCE STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr or 1928(1928 . (hereinafter SCPEA).
11. KRASNowiECEI, supra note 2, at 84; URPAN LAND INnrTT, TEcH.
BULL. No. 52, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 13 (1965).
16. SCPEA, supra note 14, at § 15.
(Vol. 35
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paratus, recreation, light and air, and for the avoidance of con-
gestion of population, including minimum width and area of
lotS.17
The rationale behind Professor Krasnowiecki's theory is that Section 15
contemplates that the "then effective zoning ordinance" will leave latitude
on the use, height, area, or bulk requirements and restrictions. Otherwise,
it would have been futile to grant the planning board power to agree with
applicants on such matters.18 Further, Section 14, providing that the plan-
ning board is to adopt subdivision regulations concerning the minimum
width and area of lots, reinforces this theory.19
3. Missouri
Missouri has no enabling legislation specifically authorizing PUD as
do several states.20 Neither Section 12 of the Model Planning Enabling
Act nor Sections 14 or 15 of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act are
incorporated into the provisions of Chapter 89 of the Missouri statutes.21
But Missouri's general enabling legislation does authorize the legislative
body of all municipalities to regulate "the location and use of buildings,
structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes,"22 and
to adopt regulations "for adequate open spaces for traffic, recreation, light
and air .... "23 Thus, Missouri's enabling legislation seems broad enough
to authorize PUD's,2 4 although it is not clear what procedure is required.25
B. Cases
1. Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Authority
In 1961, the New York Town Law Section 281 discussed supra was
challenged as unconstitutional on the theory that it lacked sufficient stand-
ards to support a delegation of power to an administrative agency. 26 The
New York court upheld the provision on the ground that the requirements
of reasonableness of the change, average population density maintenance,
adjoining lands being safeguarded, and consistency with the public welfare
constituted sufficient standards.2 7 However, the court went on to consider
17. SCPEA, supra note 14, at § 14.
18. KRASNOWIECKI, supra note 2, at 84; URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, supra
note 15, at 13.
19. Ibid.
20. ARK. STAT. § 19-2829 (b) (Supp. 1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2, 8-25
(1960); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-1001, 53-1055 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
100.203 (1) (e) (Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-54 (1967); N.Y. ToWN LAw
§8 270-282 (1965).
21. C. 89, RSMo 1959.
22. § 89.020, RSMo 1959.
23. § 89.410 (1), RSMo 1967 Supp.
24. But cf. J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1st ed. 1872) (for the
proposition that a city possesses only those powers expressly granted or necessarily
implied from express powers). See City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo. 623,
628, 10 S.W. 197, 199 (1888); City of Springfield v. Mecum, 320 S.W.2d 742, 747
(Spr. Mo. App. 1959); State v. Steinbach, 274 S.W.2d 588, 590 (St. L. Mo. App.
1955).
25. See discussion infra, pt. III, B, of this comment.
26. Hiscox v. Levine, 216 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1961).
27. Id. at 805.
1970]
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the planning board's action in that case, which involved changing the
zoning regulations for sixty-three out of one hundred acres. The court
stated that the planning board's actions under Section 281's authorization
of "reasonable changes" were administrative, not legislative, and concluded
that the board had encroached on the legislative authority to effect zoning
changes. It was held that the planning board was not endowed with power
to amend the zoning ordinance by rezoning large tracts of land.28 The
court did not specify what it considered to be "large tracts," but since pro-
posed PUD's are generally subdivisions of considerable size, the value of the
New York law in supporting PUD's is severely reduced.29 The basis for the
holding (that the power to amend zoning regulations does not include the
power to change the zoning district of the land) does little to clarify the
extent of that holding. This case involved changing zoning regulations in a
one-acre residence zoning district to those in use in a one-half acre district,
which was construed to be a change in the zoning district. But what about
the typical PUD case, where changes within a single district involve the
use of regulations common to several types of zoning districts? Until this
is clarified, Section 281 offers little help to PUD.
The situation in Kentucky provides a typical example of the back-
ground for the adoption of enabling legislation authorizing PUD's. Prior
to 1966, Kentucky had statutes which embodied both Sections 1480 and 1531
of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928.32 As discussed
earlier,8 3 the existence of both provisions lends considerable support to at-
tempts to achieve PUD's solely through the planning commission. This ap-
proach was tried in Kentucky.34 A 1964 city ordinance authorized the
planning commission to grant permits for PUD's. Following a hearing, a
developer who was denied a permit for a PUD appealed on constitutional
grounds, alleging that there was a grant of arbitrary power to the planning
commission.35 The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance, found that the planning commission had not acted arbitrarily, and
dismissed the action.80 The Kentucky Court of Appeals denied standing to
the developer to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, since the
relief the developer sought (i.e., the right to establish a PUD) would be
unavailable if the zoning ordinance were held unconstitutional. 3r In 1966,
Kentucky adopted enabling legislation authorizing PUD zoning regula-
tions.88 The statutes also provide that zoning regulations, changes, and
amendments are to be prepared and recommended to the legislative body
28. Id. at 806.
29. For a later New York decision reaffirming the philosophy that the courts
will not allow administrative bodies to reclassify the zoning of large areas, see Von
Gerichten v. Schermerhorn, 268 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591 (1966).
30. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.087 (1963).
31. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.088 (1963).
32. SCPEA supra note 14.
33. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
34. Mann v. City of Fort Thomas, 437 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
35. Id. at 210.
36. Id. at 210.
37. Id. at 211.
38. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.203 (1) (e) (Supp. 1968).
[Vrol. 35
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by the planning commission, and that a majority vote of the members of
the legislative body is necessary to override any action of the planning
commission.3 9
This same attack could be levelled at the city council which enacted
an ordinance delegating to itself the discretionary power to approve PUD
applications, since the council would be acting administratively.40 In a
New Jersey case, 41 a local ordinance which attempted to permit a great
variety of uses was deemed to be the "antithesis of zoning," and was held
to be ultra vires and void.42 The ordinance provided for normal agricul-
tural and residence uses, for numerous specified "Special Uses" 43 where
"investigation has shown that such structures and uses will be beneficial to
the general development," 44 and "light industrial uses and other similar
facilities having no adverse effect on surrounding property and deemed
desirable to the general economic well-being of the Township" 4" are
present. The court decided that such provisions, even though the ordinance
did specify the numerous types of permitted uses, were "hardly adequate
to channel local administrative discretion." 46 A recent New York case
reached a similar result.47 There, the village board of trustees established a
planned residential district which had no main permitted uses, but listed
twelve uses permitted upon issuance of special permits by the board of
appeals. This was held to be zoning not in accordance with a comprehensive
plan, and the ordinance was held invalid because the delegation of legis-
lative power to an administrative body was without sufficient standards.48
Missouri has not taken as harsh a view of the delegation of legislative
authority as have the New York and New Jersey courts. In the Guffey
case, 49 the Missouri Supreme Court was concerned with the administrative
power of the city council to authorize additional uses by granting a special
permit after a public hearing. The standards set forth in the ordinance
were: (a) application for permit submitted to council is referred to plan-
ning commission; (b) report is given by planning commission to council
with respect to the effect of the proposed use upon the character of the
neighborhood, traffic conditions, public utility facilities, and other matters
of general welfare; (c) city council holds public hearing; and (d) council
determines whether granting of the permit will promote health, safety,
morals, and general welfare of the people, in accordance with a compre-
hensive zoning plan.50 The court stated these standards were sufficiently
definite and held the ordinance constitutional.51 The Guffey case is of
39. Ky. R:Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.207, .211, .321 (1968 Supp.).
40. See State v. Guffey, 806 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. En Banc 1957).
41. Rockhill v. Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J. 117, 128 A.2d 473 (1957).
42. Id. at 127, 128 A.2d at 479.
43. Id. at 121-22, 128 A.2d at 475-76.
44. Id. at 120, 128 A.2d at 475.
45. Id. at 122, 128 A.2d at 476.
46. Id. at 127, 128 A.2d at 479.
47. Marshall v. Village of Wappingers Falls, 279 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1967).
48. Ibid.
49. State v. Guffey, 306 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. En Banc 1957).
50. Id. at 557.
51. Id. at 558; see State ex rel. Rebenau v. Beckemeier, 436 S.W.2d 52 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1968) (holding constitutional a delegation of legislative authority to a
zoning board of adjustment).
1970"]
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particular interest because the standards upheld there as constitutional are
very similar to the procedures which would be used with PUD's in Missouri.
2. Not in Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan
One of the most encouraging decisions for advocates of PUD's is the
Pennsylvania case of Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc.,52 which
analyzes and offers solutions helping to alleviate the legal problems facing
PUD's.5 3 In this case, the Borough of New Hope's council enacted an ordi-
nance creating a PUD district and another ordinance rezoning a tract of
land to PUD. Pursuant to the first ordinance, a developer submitted plans
for a PUD on that tract of land to the planning commission, which issued
building permits. Neighboring property owners appealed to the board of
adjustment, which upheld the ordinances and the permits. The neighbors
appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which invalidated the ordinances
as failing to conform to a comprehensive plan and as vesting too much dis-
cretion in the planning commission. 54 This decision was reversed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which first held that a comprehensive plan
is not "forever binding" and may be changed by new zoning ordinances if
passed "with some demonstration of sensitivity to the community as a
whole, and [to] the impact that the new ordinance will have on this com-
munity." 55 Thus the court abandoned its old test,5 6 which required a
comprehensive plan in final form prior to enactment of the zoning ordi-
nance in question. The court added that the fact that the change was made
at the request of a particular landowner did not invalidate the change. 5r
As to the contention that the ordinances vested greater authority and dis-
cretion in the planning commission than permitted by Pennsylvania's
zoning enabling legislation, the court held that the enabling act contained
nothing which would prohibit the council from creating a PUD zoning
district with many permissible uses.53
52. 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
53. But see Note, 7 DUQUESNE L. REv. 153, 163 (1968).
54. Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 631, 241 A.2d 81,
83-84 (1968).
55. Id. at 632, 241 A.2d at 84.
56. See Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of Lower Gwynedd Twp., 401 Pa. 211,
164 A.2d 7 (1960).
57. Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 635, 241 A.2d 81, 85
(1968).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 48201 (1966) provides:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general
welfare, councils of boroughs are hereby empowered to regulate and re-
strict the height, number of stories, and size of buildings and other struc-
tures, their construction, alteration, extension, repair, maintenance and all
facilities and services in or about such buildings and structures and per-
centage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other
open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of build-
ings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes,
and also to establish and maintain building lines and set back building
lines upon any or all streets;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46601 (1966) provides:
For the purpose of assuring sites suitable for building purposes and
human habitation and to provide for the harmonious development of
boroughs, for the coordination of existing streets with proposed streets,
[Vol. 35
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Comparison of these Pennsylvania statutes with Missouri's enabling leg-
islation indicates that the only Pennsylvania provisions favorable to PUD's
which are not found in Missouri's are the section 46601 provisions that the
borough may adopt by ordinance subdivision regulations including design
standards, plan requirements, and plan processing procedures. 59 The
Pennsylvania court examined the enabling legislation for planning com-
missions6 dealing with the approval of plans and plots of land, and con-
cluded that the legislation does not prohibit the planning commission from
approving PUD plans.61 At this point, the court concluded that the task of
approving a particular PUD should rest with a single municipal body. Per-
suaded by Professor Krasnowiecki's arguments, 2 the court stated that the
advantages of flexibility would be lost if an ordinance were passed which
was so detailed and specific that nothing was left for any administrator.0 3
Since zoning boards of adjustment are typically concerned with problems
on a lot-by-lot approach, the court agreed with Professor Krasnowiecki that
such a body is not competent to handle such large-scale planning and was
not intended to do so. 64 Therefore, the court concluded that the planning
parks or other features of the official street plan of the borough, for in-
suring adequate open spaces for traffic, recreation, light and air, and for
proper distribution of population, thereby creating conditions favorable
to the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the citizens, any borough
is hereby empowered to adopt, by ordinance, land subdivision regulations.
Such regulations may include definitions, design standards, plan require-
ments, plan processing procedures, improvement and construction require-
ments, and conditions of acceptance of public improvements by the
boroughs.
59. See statutes quoted note 58 supra.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 46155 (1966) provides:
All plans, plots, or replots of land laid out in building lots, and the
streets or other portions of the same, intended to be dedicated to public
use, or for the use of purchasers or owners of lots fronting thereon or ad-
jacent thereto, and located within the borough limits, shall be submitted
to the borough planning commission, and approved by it, before they shall
be recorded. It shall be unlawful to receive or record any such plan in any
public office, unless the same shall bear thereon, by endorsement or other-
wise, the approval of the borough planning commission. The disapproval
of any such plan by the borough planning commission shall be deemed
a refusal of the proposed dedication shown thereon. The approval of the
commission shall be deemed an acceptance of the proposed dedication, but
shall not impose any duty upon the borough concerning the maintenance
or improvement of any such dedicated parts, until the proper authorities
of the borough shall have made actual appropriations of the same by
entry, use, or improvement. No sewer, water, or gas main or pipe, or other
improvement, shall be voted or made, within the borough, for the use of
any such purchasers or owners, nor shall any permit for connection with,
or other use of, any such improvement existing, or for any other reason
made, be given to any such purchasers or owners, until such plan is so
approved.
61. Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 638, 241 A.2d 81,
87 (1968).
62. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established
Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 71 (1965).
63. Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 639, 241 A.2d 81, 87
(1968).
64. Id. at 640, 241 A.2d at 88.
1970]
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commission was the appropriate body to approve PUD's.6 5 Recognizing that
the planning commission is not empowered to rezone land, the court stated
that the power to approve more than one type of building within a PUD
did not amount to rezoning, since the ordinance permitted such a situa-
tion.66 Were it not for the dissimilarities between the statutory powers given
to a planning commission in Pennsylvania and in Missouri, Cheney would
be of greater significance. The Pennsylvania legislation 67 provides that
plans and plats be submitted to the planning commission for approval, and,
upon such approval, they may be recorded and acted upon. But Missouri
provides that a plat may not be filed or recorded until after the commission
makes a report and recommendation to the city council, and the council has
"approved the plat as provided by law." 68
3. Challenging PUD in Missouri
Challenges to the validity of PUD's in Missouri will most likely have to
be by declaratory judgment or injunction. Missouri's only statutory lan-
guage refers to "any person aggrieved," 69 and offers such person standing to
appeal to and from the board of zoning adjustment, an administrative body,
by the use of statutory certiorari proceedings authorized in the enabling
legislation. Such appeals relate solely to administrative decisions made
either by an "administrative officer" or by the board of adjustment itself.
It is particularly important to distinguish administrative and legislative
actions and the methods of challenging such actions in Missouri since the
Missouri statutes contemplate the planning commission's making recom-
mendations as to subdivision regulations to the council7 0 or to the county
court,7 1 and then requiring the approval of that legislative body before
such regulations go into effect. The significance of this distinction is that a
statutory certiorari proceeding72 is available for the review of administrative
actions, whereas there are no statutory provisions concerning the review of
legislative action. It is clear in Missouri that the statutory certiorari pro-
ceeding 7s is not the appropriate method of testing the validity of a purely
legislative act such as a zoning ordinance.74 The most common methods of
attacking legislative rezoning, which is essentially what is involved in
65. Id. at 641, 241 A.2d at 88.
66. Ibid.
67. See statute quoted note 60 supra.
68. § 89.400, RSMo 1967 Supp; but cf. §§ 89.420, .440, RSMo 1967 Supp.
(which cast some doubt on the meaning of § 89.400).
69. §§ 89.100, .110, 64.120 (1), .120 (3), .281 (1), .281 (4), RSMo 1959;
§§ 64.660 (1), .660 (2), RSMo 1967 Supp.
70. § 89.410 (1), RSMo 1967 Supp.
71. §§ 64.060, .241, .580, RSMo 1959.
72. §§ 89.100, .110, 64.120 (1), .120 (3), .281 (1), .281 (4), RSMo 1959; §§
64.660 (1), .660 (2), RSMo 1967 Supp.
73. §§ 89.100, .110, 64.120 (1), .120 (3), .281 (1), .281 (4), RSMo 1959; §§
64.660 (1), .660 (2), RSMo 1967 Supp.
74. State v. City of Raytown, 289 S.W.2d 153 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956).
[Vol. 35
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changes to PUD, are the use of a declaratory judgment75 or an injunction76
The Missouri courts have used similar interpretations of who has
standing to complain of legislative action as they have with the statutory
category "any person aggrieved." 77 The statutes provide that if enumerated
percentages of certain categories of neighbors protest changes in or amend-
ments to zoning regulations, a greater vote of the appropriate legislative
body will be required to approve the change. 78 Thus it seems that a primary
concern of the legislature was to provide protection for the neighboring
property owner, and this concern has been recognized in cases challenging
council action.79 Several cases have also indicated that the neighboring
property owner is a sufficiently aggrieved person within the statutory defi-
nition.80 Because of the neighboring property owner's standing to complain,
Missouri may find developers reluctant to attempt innovations such as
PUD's which do not conform to conventional practices. The only way to
alleviate this problem is to adopt enabling statutes specifically authorizing
PUD.
A challenger might argue that a rezoning for PUD or the issuance of
a PUD permit is violative of the Missouri constitutional provision re-
stricting the right to take private property for private use.8 ' The chal-
lenger's theory would be that the establishment of a PUD might decrease
the value of his private residential property for the benefit of a private
individual, the developer. But Missouri has held that rezoning is an exer-
cise of the state's police power to serve the public interest and welfare, and
the constitution is not violated even though some private person might
incidentally make a profit.8 2
A further argument in challenging a PUD could be that there must
be a showing of changed conditions in order to rezone. One decision re-
garding changes in zoning held that it is not always a prerequisite to zoning
changes to show a change in conditions.88 The analogy can be made to
justify changes in zoning desired to enable a "better" development through
establishing a PUD district, even though there are no changed physical
conditions.
III. PROCEDURES FOR PUD
A. Ideal Procedure
Proponents of PUD emphasize the desirability of procedures for the
approval of PUD's which are relatively uncomplicated and which involve
75. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963); Urn-
stein v. Village of Town and Country, 368 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1963); Porporis v.
City of Watson Woods, 352 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. 1962).
76. City of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder, 367 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1963); Kellog
v. Joint Council of Women's Auxiliaries Welfare Ass'n, 265 S.W.2d 374 (Mo.
1954).
77. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963).
78. §§ 89.060, 64.140, .271 (3), .670, RSMo 1959.
79. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963).
80. Kellog v. Joint Council of Women's Auxiliaries Welfare Ass'n, 265
S.W.2d 374, 377 (Mo. 1954); State v. Lewis, 395 S.W.2d 522, 524 (St. L. Mo. App.
1965).
81. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 28.
82. Strandberg v. Kansas City, 415 S.W.2d 737, 748 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
83. Miller v. Kansas City, 358 S.W.2d 100, 105 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962) (a
"stagnated" area resulting from unwise strip zoning).
1970]
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only a single agency.8 4 Section 12 of the model act 8 5 allowed the legislative
body to delegate to the planning commission the power to approve PUD's,
and established general standards for the commission to follow. Sections 14
and 15 of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act have been thought to
enable PUD's established entirely through the planning commission. 8
B. Missouri Procedures
1. Cities
As discussed earlier, such provisions as Section 12 of the model act
and Sections 14 and 15 of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act have
not been incorporated into the provisions of Chapter 89 of the Missouri
statutes.8 7 Section 89.020 clearly entrusts the local legislative body with
the power to regulate and restrict the use, height, area, and bulk of build-
ings and premises,88 and section 89.030 authorizes the local legislative body
to divide the municipality into zoning districts.8 9 Section 89.050 invests in
the local legislative body the power to provide for the manner in which
zoning and zoning regulations are to be originally established, enforced, and
amended, requiring only the holding of a public hearing upon fifteen
days' notice.9 0 These provisions seem to enable the local legislative body to
delegate to the planning commission the authority to handle and decide all
applications for PUD's. However, section 89.060, also dealing with amend-
ments to the regulations, provides that upon the protest of a certain propor-
tion of landowners, an amendment will fail unless it receives a three-fourth's
vote of the members of the city legislative body.91 This seems to indicate
that the provisions in section 89.050 dealing with the adopting of amend-
ments after a hearing refer to the local legislative body, and this provision
84. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established
Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. Rlv. 47, 79 (1965).
85. BAssm-r, supra note 5.
86. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
87. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
88. § 89.020, RSMo 1959 provides:
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general
welfare of the community, the legislative body of all cities, towns, and
villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number
of stories, and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of
lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces,
the density of population, the preservation of features of historical sig-
nificance, and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for
trade, industry, residence or other purposes.
89. § 89.030, RSMo 1959.
90. § 89.050, RSMo 1959 provides:
The legislative body of such municipality shall provide for the manner
in which such regulations and restrictions and the boundaries of such dis-
tricts shall be determined, established, and enforced, and from time to time
amended, supplemented, or changed. However, no such regulation, restric-
tion, or boundary shall become effective until after a public hearing in
relation thereto, at which parties in interest and citizens shall have an
opportunity to be heard. At least fifteen days' notice of the time and place
of such hearing shall be published in an official paper or a paper of gen-
eral circulation in such municipality.
91. § 89.060, RSMo 1959.
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has been so construed 9 2 Furthermore, the Missouri courts have insisted
that amendments to zoning ordinances require the same careful considera-
tion as that given to the original ordinance. 93 Thus, it seems probable that
the Missouri statutes will not permit delegating authority to approve
PUD's to the planning commission.
In areas not previously zoned, authorization of PUD's will involve sev-
eral difficulties. With zoning of original districts, which has been defined
as the establishment of zoning districts in areas not previously zoned,94
section 89.070 delineates the manner in which the local legislative body
may avail itself of its power to establish zoning districts and regulations.95
This section requires the legislative body to appoint a "Zoning Commis-
sion" (or appoint an existing planning commission as the zoning commis-
sion) to hold public hearings. 96 Then, to insure "double protection," a
second set of public hearings is to be held by the legislative body.07 Thus
it would appear that any attempt to create a PUD in an area which has not
been previously zoned would not only require consideration by both the
local legislative body and the zoning (or planning) commission, but would
also require two sets of public hearings. However, from a practical stand-
point, the entire framework of PUD's involves working with rezoning
rather than original zoning, since original zoning would only authorize the
establishment of PUD's. With the extensiveness of today's zoning, even
original authorization most likely will come through rezoning. Subsequent
to authorization, applications for PUD permits would be submitted by
developers.
In 1963, the legislature enacted sections dealing with planning for
all Missouri municipalities. 98 After authorizing the appointment of a
planning commission, 99 the statute authorizes the planning commission to
"make and adopt a city plan for the physical development of the munici-
pality."100 That section further authorizes the planning commission to:
prepare a zoning plan for the regulation of the height, area, bulk,
location and use of private, nonprofit and public structures and
premises, and of population density, but the adoption, enforce-
ment and administration of the zoning plan shall conform to the
provisions of sections 89.010 to 89.250.101
Without the proviso, it would appear that this section would offer a means
by which PUD's in original zoning could be handled entirely through the
92. Strandberg v. Kansas City, 415 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo. En Banc 1967); Mur-
rell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Mo. 1966).
93. City of Monett v. Buchanan, 411 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1967); Taylor v.
Schlemmer, 353 Mo. 687, 183 S.W.2d 913 (1944); Miller v. Kansas City, 358 S.W.2d
100 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962); Allega v. Assoc. Theatres, 295 S.W.2d 849 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1956).
94. Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1966).
95. § 89.070, RSMo 1959.
96. Ibid.
97. Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Mo. 1966).
98. Mo. Laws 1963, at 146, § 1.
99. § 89.310, RSMo 1967 Supp.
100. § 89.340, RSMo 1967 Supp. (emphasis added).
101. Ibid. (emphasis added).
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planning commission since the commission is authorized to prepare a plan
regulating height, area, bulk, and use. But the proviso requires compliance
with section 89.070, which provides for both local legislative and admin-
istrative adoption and hearings. 102 Furthermore, it is apparent from the
statutory language that the legislature meant to distinguish between the
city plan and the zoning plan, because it authorized the planning commis-
sion to "make and adopt"'0 3 the city plan, but only to "prepare" a zoning
plan.104
Finally, section 89.410 presents the most serious obstacles to attempts
in Missouri to create PUD's entirely through the planning commission.105
This section provides that "the planning commission shall recommend and
the council may by ordinance adopt regulations governing the subdivision
of land within its jurisdiction."' 06 The city council is also required to hold
a duly advertised public hearing before adoption or amendment of its sub-
division regulations.107
Although section 89.340 allows the planning commission to prepare a
zoning plan regulating height, area, bulk, and use,' 08 it is interesting to
note that the provisions of section 89.410, detailing the types of subdivision
regulations that the planning commission may recommend, are silent as to
regulations governing the above elements. 109 Yet, at the same time, that
section states that the regulations may include those "for adequate open
spaces,""u O which could be construed as recognizing the need to use PUD
in order to best achieve such open spaces.
A problem which might discourage a developer from promoting a PUD
would arise if the developer were forced to secure the approval of more
agencies or to endure more public hearings than would be required for a
standard type development. With a standard development, the number of
hearings would depend upon whether the proposed zoning was original
zoning or rezoning."' With original zoning, there will be two sets of public
hearings."12 With rezoning, only one set of hearings is required.113
If the standard development involves creating a subdivision, then a
developer must comply with subdivision regulations as well as zoning
regulations. Section 89.410 contemplates that the planning commission
recommend regulations governing the subdivision of land and that the
council adopt those regulations by ordinance. 114 The statute provides that
the council must hold a public hearing before adopting the subdivision
102. See § 89.070, RSMo 1959.
103. See § 89.360, RSMo 1967 Supp., for the procedure to be followed by the
planning commission in adopting the city plan.
104. § 89.340, RSMo 1967 Supp.
105. § 89.410, RSMo 1967 Supp.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. § 89.340, RSMo 1967 Supp.
109. § 89.410, RSMo 1967 Supp.
110. Ibid.
111. See text accompanying notes 90-97 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 94-97 supra.
113. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
114. § 89.410, RSMo 1967 Supp.
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regulations,1 15 but it is silent as to the necessity of public hearings by the
planning commission. Therefore, it would appear that only one hearing
would be required. A PUD, under this statutory scheme, would thrust no
more burdensome procedures upon the developer than would a standard
development. If the PUD required rezoning, the developer would face
more burdensome procedures, since the standard development will usually
not require rezoning. Ideally, a PUD would involve dealing with fewer
bodies than would a standard development, which requires subdivision plat
approval, all necessary rezoning, and compliance with the building and
zoning code administration. This would be possible if the approval of
PUD's could eventually be centered in the planning commission, with a
perfunctory sort of legislative approval by the city council to satisfy statu-
tory requirements. Such a possibility seems unlikely under current Missouri
statutes.
An example of a Missouri city recently adopting a PUD ordinance
allowing density but not use variations is Columbia. 116 The ordinance re-
quires an applicant to submit a "preliminary development plan" to the
planning and zoning commission which shall hold a public hearing.117
After securing the commission's approval, the applicant must submit a
"final development plan" to the commission for review and recommenda-
tion to the City Council.11 8 Reading into this ordinance either section
89.410 (8) (if this were construed as a subdivision application) or section
89.050 (if this were construed as a rezoning application), the council must
hold a public hearing after notice.'1 9 A developer would thus be confronted
not only with numerous presentations before two separate bodies, but
would be subject to at least two public hearings.
It is settled in Missouri that applications for rezoning and special per-
mits may be referred by a city's legislative body to its zoning commission
for study and for the making of recommendations to the legislative body.120
But the provisions of sections 89.050 and 89.060 still require a public hear-
ing before the local legislative body. 121 This allows a second chance at vic-
tory to neighbors and citizens who have, for example, lost one battle be-
fore the planning and zoning commission on the same matter. Furthermore,
the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized that since the power to enact
an original zoning or a rezoning ordinance is vested in the city council,
the council is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the planning
and zoning commission, especially if the council has heard the parties and
is aware of the problems involved. 2 2 Therefore, it is again apparent that a
developer may have to convince two bodies of the efficacy of his proposal
115. § 89.410 (3), RSMo 1967 Supp.
116. COLU~mIA, Mo., REv. O.Da ANcEs § 19.141 (1969).
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. § 89.410 (3), RSMo 1967 Supp.
120. Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1966).
121. Id. at 848.
122. City of Monett v. Buchanan, 411 S.W.2d 108, 114 (Mo. 1967); but cf. RK
Development Corp. v. City of Norwalk, 156 Conn. 369, 242 A.2d 781 (1968) (when
city council acts administratively in passing on a PUD application, council has no
discretion but to approve it if the plan conforms to the regulations).
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in addition to having to defend his proposals at two public hearings. Never-
theless, once the city council has acted on a proposal, either favorably or
adversely, the developer can be fairly sure that the courts will not sub-
stitute their opinions for that of the council. The courts will not interfere
if the question was "reasonably doubtful or fairly debatable,"' 23 as long as
the council's decision was not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable .... ,,124
The challenger of an ordinance has the burden of proving its unreason-
ableness.1 25
2. Counties
The provisions of Chapter 89 are not the only zoning enabling legisla-
tion which Missouri has. Chapter 64126 has numerous provisions concerning
county zoning, the contents of which differ substantially from the provi-
sions of Chapter 89. Unlike section 89.410, the three statutory provisions
governing subdivision regulations for class one,127 noncharter class one,'2 8
class two, and class three12 9 counties all provide that the county planning
commission may prepare and adopt regulations governing, among other
things, "minimum width and area of lots." Such provisions are the same
as that found in Section 14 of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act130
which offers a basis for PUD's handled by the planning commission. The
above sections further provide that such regulations become effective only
after the holding of a public hearing by the planning commission, adoption
by the planning commission, and approval and adoption by the county
court.1 3 ' However, the statutory language to the effect that the county
planning commission is to both prepare and adopt the regulations seems
to indicate that the role of the county court is purely that of a "formal
adoption." Thus it would appear permissible to effectuate a PUD in Mis-
souri counties solely through the planning commission. It is certainly easier
to justify PUD type subdivision regulations adopted by a county planning
commission than by a city planning commission because of the above
discussed difference in the statutory enabling language for counties as
compared to cities. The argument can also be advanced that the legislature,
by specifically including such a provision in the county statutes and not
including it in the city statutes, intended that the city planning commissions
were not to have such powers.
One Missouri county which has adopted PUD ordinances to establish
a planning commission procedure for the approval of PUD permits is St.
Louis County.13 2 The county has provided that upon application of an
123. Miller v. Kansas City, 358 S.W.2d 100 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
124. City of Monett v. Buchanan, 411 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1967); Miller v. Kan-
sas City, 358 S.W.2d 100 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962); Allega v. Assoc. Theatres, 295
S.W.2d 849 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956).
125. City of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder, 367 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. 1963); Flora
Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 246 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. En Banc 1952).
126. C. 64, RSMo 1959.
127. § 64.060, RSMo 1959.
128. § 64.241, RSMo 1959.
129. § 64.580, RSMo 1959.
130. SCPEA, supra note 14, at § 14.
131. §§ 64.060, .241, .580, RSMo 1959.
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owner (or his representative) of property sought to be used for a PUD, and
following a public hearing conducted by the planning commission, such
commission may give "preliminary approval."' 3 3 The county council then
must approve the application, after which the matter is returned to the
planning commission for its approval of a "final development plan" to be
submitted by the applicant.3 4 This procedure is almost totally in the
hands of the planning commission, and only one public hearing is re-
quired. However, the approval of the county council is required, and such
approval might not always be purely a formality.
3. Further Problems under Current Missouri Statutes
One problem which large-scale developers will encounter in Missouri
relates to the bonding of subdivision improvements. 36 The statutes require
street improvements and installation of utility facilities or the bonding
thereof as a condition precedent to plat approval.' 36 For the developer of
a large area, the cost of bonding can be extremely high. Even though the
project may be constructed in stages, cities may be reluctant to accept as-
surances of completion on a section-by-section basis because of their fear
that the entire project might not be finished. Such an approach is not only
more expensive for the developer, but could create difficulties if a developer
made the necessary improvements in future sections (rather than bonding
them), and then the growth of the project created the need to alter the
planned development.37 Flexibility would be hindered.
One aspect of the Missouri statute which is extremely helpful to the
developer desirous of establishing a PUD is the provision authorizing
tentative approval of a subdivision plat'38 by the city council.13 9 This
allows the developer to secure some approval of his plan before he is re-
quired to bond improvements. However, the statute makes it explicit that
such tentative approval shall not be entered on the plat, and that comple-
tion or bonding must occur before final approval. 40 Some assurance should
be given to the developer that future disputes over the plan or about the
stage-by-stage construction of the project will not jeopardize the entire de-
velopment. Missouri, like almost all states, provides no such assurance.141
133. ST. Louis CouNTY, Mo., REv. ORDINANCES § 1003.183 (1), § 1003.185 (3),§ 1003.187 (4) (1965 Supp.).
134. ST. Louis CouNTY, Mo., REv. ORDINANCES § 1003.183 (1), § 1003.185 (3),§ 1003.187 (4) (1965 Supp.).
135. For an excellent discussion of this problem generally, see Krasnowiecki,
Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of
Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 91-94 (1965).
136. §§ 64.060, .241, .580, RSMo 1959; § 89.410 (2), RSMo 1967 Supp.
137. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established
Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 47, 93 (1965).
138. § 89.410 (2), RSMo 1967 Supp.
139. See, e.g., COLUMIA, Mo., REV. ORDINANCES § 19.141 (1969); ST. Louis
CouNTY, Mo., R.xv. ORDINANCES, § 1003.187 (1965 Supp.).
140. § 89.410, RSMo 1967 Supp.
141. For a discussion of such assurances, see Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit De-
velopment: A Challenge to Established Theory and Practice of Land Use Control,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 95-96 (1965).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although of early origin,142 PUD has been a relatively dormant crea-
ture with both local authorities and developers. 14 3 As Professor Krasnowiecki
has pointed out, it is the duty of the lawyer to ascertain the legal aspects
which tend to make PUD impractical or risky, and to analyze current
zoning and subdivision control laws to ascertain what modifications need
to be made.144 Scholars in this area have drafted a Model State Enabling
Act for Planned Unit Residential Development' 4 5 and have proposed
ordinances' 40 which aid in solving many of the legal problems surround-
ing PUD.
PUD in Missouri has not been widely adopted but is growing in popu-
larity. With no judicial tests and a lack of widespread use, the specific
legal problems PUD may face in Missouri cannot be clearly delineated.
However, statutory changes will be required to insure the success of PUD's
in Missouri. PUD's should be specificially authorized by state enabling
legislation.147 Of greatest significance in Missouri is the necessity for such
legislation to clearly authorize the centering of PUD approval within one
agency, such as the planning commission, and to provide that such pro-
cedures are in lieu of other procedures for approvals required under Mis-
souri's conventional zoning and subdivision statutes. 148 A complete review
and analysis of conventional laws with a view toward such modifications
making PUD workable in Missouri will surely be more advisable than an
attempt to effectuate PUD's solely through existing laws, which may impede
its full and widespread acceptance.
CLIFFORD H. AHRENS
142. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
143. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established
Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 144 U. PA. L. Rlv. 47, 48 (1965).
144. Id. at 49.
145. Babcock, An Introduction to the Model Enabling Act for Planned Resi-
dential Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 136 (1965); URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, TECr.
BULL. No. 52, LEGAL AsPEcrs OF PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 65
(1965).
146. See, e.g., 4 R. ANDERSON, ArmRicAN LAw OF ZONING § 26.61 (1968); URBAN
LAND INSTITUTE, supra note 145, at 84.
147. See note 145 supra.
148. See, e.g., MODEL ENABLING ACr § 5 (); Babcock, An Introduction to the
Model Enabling Act for Planned Residential Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
136, 157; URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, supra note 145, at 77.
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